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State Consumer Protection
in A Federal System
Robert M. O'Neil*
Increasing interest in consumerism has brought intensified efforts
at every level of government to protect the consumer. While federal
regulation seems desirable for nationally marketed products and inter-
state activities, the states retain the duty to protect the health and
safety of their citizens. Where state regulation is more restrictive
than concurrent federal regulation, however, the constitutional issue
of preemption arises.
This Article analyzes the factors which have influenced the courts
in resolving conflicts between federal and state regulation in the
consumer field. Emphasizing the need for concurrent regulation, the
author formulates guidelines by which the courts can examine the
purposes and extent of consumer protection by competing govern-
mental entities to resolve the issue of preemption.
I. INTRODtJMrTON: TBE GROWTH OF REGULATION
A decade ago there was little risk of collision between federal and state
regulation in the field of consumer protection. Such regulation was so modest
that various agencies had ample latitude. When a manufacturer or retailer
sought to avoid regulation by pointing to parallel or overlapping state and
federal laws, the claim usually could be dismissed as disingenuous or evasion-
ary. Within a few years all this has changed. Both federal and state activity
in the consumer field have expanded rapidly. What seemed a bare possibility
of conflict in the mid-1960's has become reality. The risks of confusion,
overlap, and competition between regulatory sectors are quite real.
A. Federal Regulation
Federal consumer protection has long been concentrated in the Federal
Trade Commission. Today, however, nearly 40 federal agencies have some
role in consumer protection.' Many of these agencies have only peripheral
*Professor of Law and Vice President (Bloomington Campus), Indiana University. A.B. 1956,
A.M. 1957, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University.
1. For a listing of these agencies and a summary of their activities and responsibilities in
consumer protection, see D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION:
TEXT & MATERIALS 21-40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSCHILD & CARROLL].
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involvement;' others exercise specific functions in the consumer field without
serious risk of conflicting with other levels of government.3 The current
problems arise from newer entries into the field: Newly created agencies
(e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Commission4 ), new responsibilities
assigned to existing agencies (e.g., the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act'),
and the reactivation of old laws by old agencies for the benefit of consumer
groups (e.g., the recently intensified "consumerism" of the Federal Trade
Commission'). The past several years have infused into the federal government
a new level of consumer concern and a greatly expanded arsenal of weapons
for the protection of consumer interests.
B. State Regulation
A growth of concern and activity at the state level has paralleled the federal
expansion. Most states have now established consumer protection bureaus
or divisions in the office of either the attorney general or the governor.!
Several states have instituted separate departments of consumer affairs.' The
laws creating these divisions are quite recent, nearly all having been enacted
since 1965 and many since 1970. The precise model varies from state
to state: Some have adopted the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,10
others the Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act," and
2. E.g., the Department of Interior, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
3. E.g., the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
4. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1970).
6. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
7. The unfair or deceptive trade practice statutes of the various states are listed in
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION, Table 9(a) (Jan. 1976). See also COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, CONSUMER
PROTECTION 399 (rev. ed. 1971); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION (Dec. 1973); Note, Consumer Protection
by the State Attorneys General: A Time for Renewal, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 410, 411
(1973) [hereinafter cited as A Time for Renewal].
8. The states are Connecticut, Delaware, and Oklahoma (limited to consumer credit
matters); Puerto Rico also has a separate consumer affairs department. COMMITTEE
ON THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENER1AL 415 (Feb. 1971); NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION
13 (Dec. 1973).
9. A recent compilation of these statutes is found in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION, Table 9(a) (Jan. 1976).
10. 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 325 (1970). A statistical survey listing 13 states which had
adopted consumer protection laws modeled on the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act is found in COMMITTEE OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, CONSUMER PROTECTION 399, 400 (rev. ed.
1971). See A Time for Renewal, supra note 7, at 414.
11. The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act [UTPCPA], developed by
the Federal Trade Commission and adopted by the Committee of State Officials on
Suggested State Legislation, was first published in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION A-71 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION]. See id. at 141. Significant amendments to the UTPCPA were published
[ARiz. ST. L.J,
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some blend provisions from these and other uniform laws.1"
Quite apart from the growth of state enabling legislation, and perhaps more
significant in terms of the potential for conflict, has been the dramatic increase
in personnel and resources committed to consumer protection activity by
state and local governments. While consumer protection divisions are generally
considered understaffed in terms of the problems facing them, several states
have large professional staffs.'" Both staffs and budgets have continued to
increase despite general cutbacks in many facets of state and local govern-
ment.'
C. Conflict Between State and Federal Regulation
Such rapid growth has produced conflict between federal and state regula-
tion for the protection of consumers. All such conflicts could be resolved if
Congress expressed an intention either to preempt the field or to leave it to the
states. But Congress, reluctant to move boldly in the sensitive area of federal-
state relations, has done little. Even when explicit language does appear in
regulatory laws,"5 it tends to be ambiguous or fails to anticipate the full range
of federal-state interaction. Moreover, lawyers representing multi-state cor-
porations have been unusually imaginative in finding loopholes. Thus, the
theoretical capacity of Congress to resolve the conflict remains unused.
Indirect interaction of two regulatory systems also may cause conflicts;
one example is found in the private tort suit against a federally regulated
manufacturer that is based on state products liability law. Attempts to
resolve conflicts between state and federal regulatory agencies would have
difficulty with such collateral tensions. Yet these issues form a substantial
part of the problem of federal-state interaction in the consumer area.
Conflicts can be partially mitigated through inter-governmental cooperation.
in 1969 and 1970. Id. at C-5 (1969); id. at 141 (1970). A statistical survey listing
the states which had adopted various provisions of the UTPCPA before 1971 is found
in COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, CONSUMER PROTECTION 399-402 (rev. ed. 1971 ). For a compre-
hensive study of state laws modeled on the UTPCPA, see Lovett, State Deceptive
Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TULANE L. REV. 724 (1972). See also Breeden & Lovett,
Louisiana's New Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law, 20 LA. B.J.
307 (1973); A Time for Renewal, supra note 7, at 413. The most widely adopted
version of the UTPCPA embodies prohibitory language substantially identical to that
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
See R.I. C EN. LAws ANN. § 6-13.1-3 (1969); SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra
at C-5 (1969).
12. Basic statutory provisions are listed in U.S. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, STATE CONSU IER ACTION SUMMARY 52-60 (1974).
13. Id. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENER.AL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR
CONSUMER PROTECTION 13 (Dec. 1973).
14. This conclusion and other comments on state consumer protection agencies are based
in part on a survey conducted in 1972 and 1973 by the author and by Daniel Schneider
of the Ohio Bar. Chief law enforcement officers or other appropriate divisions of
virtually every state responded. Copies of these replies are on file with the author and
at the Arizona State Law Journal. See also Report from the (Ohio) Attorney General,
William J. Brown, April/May 1974, at 203.
15. E.g., the Wholesome Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970).
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Since the mid-1960's the Federal Trade Commission has maintained a special
section on federal-state cooperation. In addition to disseminating information,'
this section encourages states and their subdivisions to adopt laws which
complement federal consumer protection provisions.' FTC field offices have
sought to facilitate coordination at the regional level among various public
agencies and even private groups concerned with consumer problems." Such
cooperation does not cover the entire field of potential conflict and confusion.
It would be impossible to anticipate through collaborative machinery all the
possible areas of interaction. Moreover, the FTC appears to be the only
federal agency which maintains liaison of this type. This is unfortunate, for
although it is the largest federal consumer protection unit, it is by no means
the only one.
Many conflicts can only be resolved through adjudication. There is relatively
little law dealing specifically with federal-state interaction in the consumer
protection area, although during the past half century courts have dealt with
many analogous issues and have evolved a substantial body of constitutional
precedent.
Perhaps the most complex formula for federal-state interaction in the
consumer field is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act." The new federal
warranty and disclosure requirements contained in the Act are generally
preemptive in the consumer product area, but the Act also provides for the
survival of selected portions of state law remedies that serve the interests
of federal law."0 Further administrative rulings will be necessary to clarify
16. See, e.g., Dixon, Federal-State Cooperation to Combat Unfair Trade Practices, 39 STATE
GOV'T 37-38 (1966), in which the Chairman of the Commission described in some
detail the creation and the responsibilities of this new liaison section.
17. Id. at 39-40. See Federal Trade Commission, News Release, July 7, 1966 (letter from
Chairman Paul Rand Dixon to Hon. William D. Carey, Executive Assistant Director,
Bureau of the Budget, April 14, 1966). For further discussion of the same proposals,
see Federal Trade Commission, News Release, Aug. 13, 1969 (letter from Chairman
Paul Rand Dixon to Hon. Phillip S. Hughes, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget).
18. See Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, in
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 545, at A-5 (Nov. 11, 1972) (outlining federal-state
coordination procedure). See also Akanatsu, Looking Out for the Consumer, FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION CENTER REPORT No. 285, at 506 (July 1972).
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
20. The Act in part provides:
(b)(2) Nothing in this chapter (other than sections 2304(a)(2) and
(4) and 2308 of this title) shall (A) affect the liability of, or impose liability
on, any person for personal injury, or (B) supersede any provision of State
law regarding consequential damages for injury to the person or other injury.
(c)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in para-
graph (2) of this subsection, a State requirement-
(A) which relates to labeling or disclosure with respect to written
warranties or performance thereunder;
(B) which is within the scope of an applicable requirement of
sections 2302, 2303 and 2304 of this title (and rules implementing
such sections), and
(C) which is not identical to a requirement of section 2302, 2303,
or 2304 of this title (or a rule thereunder),
shall not be applicable to written warranties complying with such sections
(or rules thereunder).
(2) If, upon application of an appropriate State agency, the Com-
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the relationship between prior existing state law, including Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1 and the new federal law.
II. PREEMPTION AND THE CONSUMER: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The supremacy clause of the Constitution2 has been invoked over the years
in a wide variety of contexts displaying no particular unifying theme. In few
fields of constitutional law has the Supreme Court relied so heavily upon
case by case adjudication.
One attempt to resolve some of the preemption issues was Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.3 A California law prohibited sale of avocados
having less than 8 percent oil content; 4 fruit which failed the test was deemed
immature and unfit for market. Under this law, a high percentage of Florida
avocados was excluded from California markets although West Coast avocados,
which generally have more oil, usually passed the test. Because the Florida
avocados met the terms of a federal agricultural marketing agreement,"
Florida growers attacked the California law as invalid under the supremacy
clause." In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court disposed of the
supremacy clause issue:
[F]ederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive
reasons--either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits
no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably so ordained."
The Court then examined the nature of the regulated field to determine
whether it was "a subject by its very nature admitting only of national
superintendence," and on this ground rejected the preemption claim of the
mission determines (pursuant to rules issued in accordance with section
2309 of this title) that any requirement of such State covering any transaction
to which this chapter applies (A) affords protection to consumers greater
than the requirements of this chapter and (B) does not unduly burden inter-
state commerce, then such State requirement shall be applicable (notwith-
standing the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection) to the extent
specified in such determination for so long as the State administers and
enforces effectively any such greater requirement.
Id. § 2311(b)(2), (c)(1), (2).
21. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-312 to -318.
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
23. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
24. CAL. Acnic. CODE §§ 44951-53 (West 1968).
25. 373 U.S. at 138-39. The Court cound that the locally drafted and administered agree-
ments were part of a congressional scheme which was designed to promote orderly
competition among South Florida growers and not designed to establish a pervasive
federal scheme. Id. at 150-51. See 7 C.F.R. § 915.20 (1975).
26. Three constitutional issues had been raised in the district court and were before the
Supreme Court on direct appeal: Commerce clause, equal protection, and preemption.
The case was remanded on the commerce clause issue. 373 U.S. at 152-56.
27. Id. at 142. Preemption clearly occurs when compliance with both federal and state
regulations is physically impossible. If, for example, a federal regulation forbade
shipment from Florida of an avocado with more than 7 percent oil content while
California would not allow fruit with less than 8 percent oil content into the state,
the state regulation would be invalid. Id. at 143.
1975:7151
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Florida growers .2 "The maturity of avocados," observed the majority through
Mr. Justice Brennan, "seems to be an inherently unlikely candidate for
exclusive federal regulations." 9
Earlier decisions involving the non-health aspects of food retailing" were
cited as supporting the view that "the supervision of the readying of foodstuffs
for market has always been deemed a matter of peculiarly local concern.""1 Fed-
eral regulation of one end of a stream of commerce did not inherently require
the states to keep their hands off the other end. The Court did not distinguish
between protecting consumers against wasting money on immature produce
and protecting health or safety. In fact, the Court seems to have deliberately
declined a clear invitation to establish a hierarchy of state regulatory interests.
Thus, by implication, preventing deception is as constitutionally valid a
purpose as preventing disease in event of a federal-state conflict."
After finding concurrent regulation neither impossible nor incompatible
with the nature of the field, the Court turned to the intent of Congress.
Given its presumption against preemption, the Court would not "conclude
that Congress legislated the ouster of this California statute by the marketing
orders in the absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate to that
effect."3" Nothing in the Agricultural Adjustment Act 4 specifically foreclosed
higher or different state rules for the marketing of federally inspected produce.
While the federal statute did set "minimum standards of quality and maturity
[to] effectuate ... orderly marketing ... in the public interest,"35 such general
language did not require a holding of preemption.36 Other sections of the Act,
moreover, revealed a rather narrow view of the legal import of marketing
agreements and were concerned primarily with the point of origin rather than
with the destination market. Avocado growers in various regions presumably
would be free to adopt (and the Secretary of Agriculture presumably would
approve) marketing orders which gauged maturity in entirely different ways,
suggesting that national uniformity was not deemed essential. The Court also
was influenced by the manner in which the Florida growers' marketing
agreement was adopted; it was a product of the affected growers themselves,
rather than impartial experts, and thus subject to more than a touch of self-




30. E.g., Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894) (color of margarine).
31. 373 U.S. at 144.
32. Id. at 146.
33. Id. at 146-47.
34. 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970).
35. Id. § 602(3) (1970) (as amended).
36. 373 U.S. at 147-48.
37. Id. at 149-50.
[Amrz. ST. L.J.
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The majority's conclusion on the preemption issue was sharply disputed
by the four dissenters, Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, and White. In their
view the California law violated the supremacy clause because it had the
practical effect of excluding from the state a substantial amount of Florida
produce which had met federal standards. The dissenters took a different view
of the purpose of the federal marketing agreements program and the legal
effect to be given approval of such agreements by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture."8 After intensive analysis of statutory provisions and legislative history,
they concluded:
The conflict between federal and state law is unmistakable here.
The Secretary asserts certain Florida avocados are mature. The state
[California] law rejects them as immature. And the conflict is over
a matter of central importance to the federal scheme ...
We have, then, a case where the federal regulatory scheme is
comprehensive, pervasive, and without a hiatus which the state
regulations could fill. Both the subject matter and the statute call
for uniformity.9
During the same term as the Avocado decision, the Court reviewed another
preemption claim in the consumer context. In Head v. New Mexico Board of
Examiners in Optometry,"' a New Mexico law forbidding the advertising of
eyeglass prices4 was challenged by a radio station on several constitutional
grounds including alleged conflict with the authority of the Federal Com-
munications Commission. While recognizing that the content of advertising
might play some role in an FCC decision to renew or revoke a broadcaster's
license, the Court unanimously held that the federal law did not foreclose state
regulation of eyeglass advertising. "The nature of the regulatory power given
to the federal agency," wrote Mr. Justice Stewart for the majority, "convinces us
that Congress could not have intended its grant of authority to supplant all
the detailed state regulation of professional advertising practices .... "
Several factors reinforced that conclusion, among them the Commission's
drastic sanction for dealing with errant licensees and the large number of
states having similar laws which would be displaced by a preemption
holding.'
Mr. Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in the Avocado case,
offered a slightly different view in a separate concurring opinion. He noted
that the FCC could use less drastic sanctions than revoking or cancelling
licenses, and had shown some interest in advertising practices." Thus, pre-
38. Id. at 159-78.
39. Id. at 173, 176.
40. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
41. Law of March 15, 1937, ch. 99, § 1, [19371 N. M. Laws 269 (repealed 1973).
42. 374 U.S. at 431.
43. Id. at 434 (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 435-37.
1975:715]
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emption could not be avoided because of any lack of federal authority in the
the field. Rather, Justice Brennan thought the answer must come through
application of the several tests in the Avocado case. The field of retail
advertising, was not one that required exclusive federal superintendence."
A broadcaster could comply with both federal and state law. There was no
clear evidence of federal intent to preempt the field; regulation of broad-
casting was confined to certain specific facets of licensee conduct, with the
implication that others should remain open to state regulation." Finally, the
operation of the state law did not threaten the federal superintendence of
the field:
The New Mexico law is one designed principally to protect the
State's consumers against a local evil by local application to forbid
certain forms of advertising in all mass media. Such legislation,
whether concerned with the health and safety of consumers, or with
their protection against fraud and deception, embodies a traditional
state interest of the sort which our decisions have consistently
respected. '
Since 1963 there have been remarkably few Supreme Court decisions on
supremacy clause matters. 8 None of these has shed more light on consumer
protection issues than the Avocado and Head cases. Meanwhile, lower federal
and state courts, faced with regulatory conflicts in the consumer area, have
looked to Avocado for guidance.'
III. PREEMPTION GUMELINES: LIMITING ThE FIELD
Four situations involve federal-state interaction in the consumer area but
do not invoke the supremacy clause. First, no preemption question exists
when both federal and state agencies are engaged in non-regulatory activity
such as gathering and disseminating data for the benefit of consumers,
encouraging sound buying practices, describing remedies, or exposing fraud
and deception. Even if collaboration in such ventures is not guaranteed by
liaison machinery such as the FTC Section on Federal-State Cooperation,"0
45. Id. at 442.
46. Id. at 443.
47. Id. at 445.
48. Welfare eligibility: Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); see generally Liberty,
Equality and Welfare Reform, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 74 (1973). State regulation of
commercial aircraft: City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973). Copyrights and patents conflict with state unfair competition: Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
49. E.g., Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 856 (3d Cir. 1975) (termination of
franchise agreements without cause); Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 487 F.2d
640, 644 (10th Cir. 1974) (state registration of transfers of pledged shares of unregis-
tered stock); Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431, 433 (2d
Cir. 1971) (pressurized products); State v. 28 Containers of Thick & Frosty, 82 Wash.
2d 722, 514 P.2d 140 (1973) (labeling of substitute dairy products).




the possibility that a federal agency would demand or disclose information
subversive to the enforcement of state law, and vice versa, is remote. Even if
conflict occurred in this context, interagency discussion or legislative revision
would seem more appropriate than litigation.
Second, no preemption question exists when a state regulation or require-
ment is less stringent than a federal law. Absent a specific exemption for
matters regulated by states,51 the federal standard would be preemptive. All
persons subject to federal law must meet the higher federal standard. Yet
Congress might insist that where a state remedy exists, it must be pursued
before a matter is brought to a federal tribunal. The exhaustion of remedies
requirement may postpone, but does not preclude, the application of a
higher federal standard.
Third, when federal and state standards are identical, no preemption issue
is presented. 2 The only risk of conflict is that state courts may construe the
same provisions differently. That risk inheres in any judicial system, however.
Two federal judges may differ on the interpretation of statutory language
as easily as judges from federal and state courts. The only alternative would
be to hold that state law may not operate at all, or at least must await federal
construction of common statutory provisions. Such a holding would cripple
state and local consumer protection efforts and would be entirely at variance
with the concept of a flexible federal system."
Even where the substantive provisions are identical, state law may require
different levels of proof or may impose harsher sanctions for a given infraction
and thus conflict with federal law. If the variances are slight and do not
disrupt the federal regulatory scheme, further inquiry may be unnecessary.
Finally, federal and state law may conflict without invoking preemption."
A recent occurrence illustrates this fourth category, In the summer of
1974, the California Milk Producers Board, a state agency representing
dairy processors, sponsored a series of television commercials designed to
stimulate demand for dairy products. The advertisements featured numerous
celebrities lauding the nutritive value of milk. Among other claims, the ads
asserted that milk would cure various ills, including some which it could
not possibly remedy. The FTC announced it would initiate proceedings
against the California Board for misleading the consuming public. The FTC
was concerned about the effects on persons with allergic reactions to milk
51. See, e.g., Marketlines, Inc. v. Chamberlain, 63 Ill. App. 2d 274, 211 N.E,2d 399
(1965).
52. For example, many states have passed "Little FTC" laws: Massachusetts, Montana,
Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION 34 (Dec. 1973).
53. Statement of Gale P. Gotschall, Counsel for Federal-State Cooperation, Federal Trade
Commission, before the Joint Committee on Consumer Protection of the Florida Legis-
lature, Nov. 21, 1969.
54. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Catherwood, 388 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1968).
1975:7151
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or with "lactose intolerance." After the FTC made its announcement, the
California Attorney General's office planned to seek a federal injunction
against the FTC on the grounds that state agencies were exempt from
FTC regulation."
The milk dispute would have raised preemption issues if the state consumer
agency had enjoined commercials which the Federal Trade Commission had
held to be nondeceptive. The latter case is the central concern of this Article;
guiding principles are badly needed for this situation.
IV. PREEMPTrON GumDELmNEs: THE EASY CAsEs-A STARTING PoIN'r
Perhaps the clearest situation leading to federal preemption occurs when
the nature of the field precludes all state regulation. Examples are relatively
rare, since the distribution of power in our federal system creates a broad
presumption in favor of concurrent regulation." A persuasive case can be
made for exclusive federal regulation in some areas of consumer interests, at
least with respect to nationally advertised and distributed goods. A recent
report of the Council of State Governments, an unlikely proponent of state
abstention, summarizes a case for federal primacy:
Most consumer products are produced for the national market.
The safety and purity of these products and how they are packaged,
labeled and advertised in national media are matters of national
concern and should be regulated by national authority. Congress has
and, apparently with some renewal of vigor, will continue to provide
these standards .... This leadership role of the federal government
in rule initiation, interpretation and application is crucial to consumer
protection because the problems involved require great expertise, as
in assessing the seriousness of the probable side effects of a new drug
or the probable life and hazards of a new turbine engine for
automobiles."
The above statement does not propose that state and local governments
withdraw from consumer protection. While the federal government may be
best equipped to formulate standards for national products, those standards
can be enforced quite effectively at state levels. In many consumer areas the
state and local interest in consumer protection is strong and well established.
A vast and diverse body of non-federal legislation exists that would suddenly
be displaced if this field were held to require exclusive federal superinten-
dence. " Moreover, the federal government could not practicably assume all
consumer protection activity. Many federal agencies, while anxious to promote
55. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1974, at 59, col. 3.
56. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
57. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES 19-20(1970).
58. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 98, § 56B (1972), which requires all markets
selling p re-packaged meats to provide weight scales for customer use; this requirement
was held not preempted by the Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-91 (1970).
Commonwealth v. Haseotes, 356 Mass. 230, 249 N.E.2d 639 (1969).
[ARTZ. ST. L.J.
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uniformity and avoid conflict or confusion, have argued vigorously for shared
responsibility in the consumer field. " Given the state interest in protecting
the health and safety of citizens, a holding of complete preemption might
violate the tenth amendment to the Constitution. Thus, it seems clear that con-
sumer protection does not, by its basic nature, require exclusive federal regu-
lation.
Certain consumer matters demand a single body of law. A few years ago
New Jersey prohibited the advertising of passage upon a vessel without a
clear indication of the vessel's country of origin and its registry. 1 The state
Attorney General contended that the law was designed to alert New Jersey
citizens to the foreign registry of ocean-going ships, and thereby provide
a warning that such ships often did not follow American safety standards.
When the Cunard Line challenged the law, the field was found to be
federally preempted. 2 The power of Congress to regulate and control foreign
commerce and, with the President, to guide international relations, was
emphasized in the New Jersey decision. The court implied that any state
interference with these federal prerogatives could hopelessly encumber an
area of national importance.63 This provides a rare but illustrative example
of preemption based not upon conflict in the operation of particular laws,
but on the nature of the regulated field.
An obvious finding of federal preemption results when compliance with
both federal and state regulations is literally impossible, Such a conflict was
hypothesized by the Supreme Court in the Avocado case: A federal marketing
order forbidding the exportation from a state of avocados having more than
7 percent oil content while the market state forbade avocados having less
than 8 percent oil content." A grower exporting avocados could not comply
with both federal and state law. Without question, the state law must yield. 5
Preemption through impossibility has been applied to current consumer
regulation. At one time, Michigan law required that meat have 12 percent
protein content." The Federal Wholesome Meat Act 7 prohibited sale in
interstate commerce of meat containing less than 11.2 percent protein, but
did not set minimum percentages for other ingredients. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held the Michigan law unconstitutional as being pre-
empted by the federal statute, although conceding that compliance with
59. See notes 16-18 supra.
60. See ROTHSCHILD & CARROLL, supra note 1, at 296-98.61. N.J. STA-r. ANN¢. §§ 2A:170-77.13, .14 (1971).
62. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Lucci. 92 N.J. Super. 148, 222 A.2d 522 (Super. Ct. Chancery
Div. 1966), a/I'd, 94 N.J. Super. 440, 228 A.2d 719 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
63. 92 N.J. Super. at 160, 222 A.2d at 528-29.
64. 373 U.S. at 143.
65. Id.
66. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 12.964(2) (a)(1) (1973).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970). Section 607 allows the Secretary of Agriculture to
promulgate standards of identification.
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both statutes was not impossible. 8 The court found a substantial risk that
a problem might arise in the future because the federal government had the
power to regulate the amount of each ingredient. A manufacturer meeting
Michigan's 12 percent protein requirement would have to reduce the per-
centages of other ingredients. Thus, compliance with the Michigan statute
would become impossible if federal power in the field were fully exercised."'
Congress can, of course, decree national uniformity; yet relatively few
federal regulatory laws contain unambiguous preemption language.0 One
recent example of such a definitive preemption declaration is found in the
1972 Consumer Product Safety Act.71 This legislation forbids any attempt by
a state or political subdivision of a state to prescribe or regulate safety
standards for the products covered by the Federal Act."
Although the language is plainly drawn, interpretive questions might arise
over the scope of preemption. In that event the presence of such clear language
will aid the courts in resolving any possible preemption controversies. One
problem which may survive involves a private suit in tort against a manufac-
turer or seller of a product subject to the Federal Act. State courts might
create a standard of product liability higher than or different from the federal
agency standards. Does state "regulation" as proscribed by the Act include
a court decision which extends strict liability to certain defective products?
Tort decisions could undermine uniformity just as effectively as the divergent
rules of a state agency. To date, the courts do not seem to have addressed
this issue.
Although resolution of many preemption problems has been simple, more
troubling decisions lie ahead. Most state and local regulation in the consumer
area is not preempted because of the nature of the field, the impossibility of
dual compliance, or an express congressional declaration. Therefore, courts
reconcile potentially conflicting laws under a vague set of guidelines and
principles and a half century's ad hoc adjudication. The results may be erratic;
68. Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76, 82 (6th Cir. 1972). The 11.2 percent figure was
not provided in the statute, but was drawn from the allowable percentages of other
ingredients. See 9 C.F.R. § 319.180 (1975).
69. 468 F.2d at 82.
70. If Congress had been more willing to give such guidance, the courts would have
been spared most of the troublesome preemption cases that have plagued them over
the years. See Note, Preemption As a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc-
tion, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973).
72. Whenever a consumer product safety standard under this act is in effect
and applies to a risk of injury associated with a consumer product, no State
or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish
or to continue in effect any provision of a safety standard or regulation
which prescribes any requirements as to the performance, composition, con-
tents, design, finish, construction, packaging, or labeling of such product which
are designed to deal with the same risk of injury associated with such con-
sumer product, unless such requirements are identical to the requirements




federal court decisions within a year forbade Michigan from regulating the
protein content of sausages, 3 yet allowed New York to regulate labeling based
on the constituent matter of frankfurters." These and other increasingly
complex and troublesome cases raise additional considerations.
V. PREEMPTION GUIDELINES: THE HARD CASES
Where the nature of the field permits the coexistence of both federal
and state regulation and Congress has not clearly spoken either way, courts
must look elsewhere for guidance. The occasional Supreme Court guidelines
are too abstract and too general to harmonize individual cases. These cases
provide only a starting point for further analysis.
The preemption problem in its clearest form was presented when the
Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development promulgated regula-
tions concerning the use of lead-based paint in federally assisted or federally
operated renewal projects." The rules required that cracking, scaling, or
peeling lead-based paint must be removed, but that paint which had not yet
"broken down" could remain on the walls.76 The Philadelphia Department
of Public Health adopted a more stringent rule that required complete
removal of all lead-based paint on surfaces accessible to children. HUD often
acquired buildings for rehabilitation and resale and budgeted for that purpose
enough money to meet the federal rules on paint removal. Philadelphia
strictly enforced its regulation. Wherever a resident child suffered lead
poisoning and inspection revealed noncompliance, the building was con-
demned unless all lead-based paint was removed. Thus conflict between the
federal and city standards was inevitable. A public interest group brought
suit in federal court to compel HUD compliance with the city regulation."7
The court ruled that the city's higher standard was not preempted and could
be validly enforced, even against HUD as the errant landlord."8
The lead paint case presents difficult problems. Concurrent federal and
state or local regulation has not been foreclosed in any manner discussed in
the previous section. Moreover, the local interest in protecting city children
from brain damage through lead poisoning is unusually compelling. On the
other hand, the federal agency must have carefully considered the particular
lead-paint standard, entitling that standard to considerable deference by state
and local regulators. The city's higher standards would increase the cost of
renovating dwellings that are already at the marginal level and thus may
73. Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F2d 76 (6th Cir. 1972); see notes 66-69 s-upra and
accompanying text.
74. Swift & Co. v. Walkley, 369 F. Supp. 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
75. 24 C.F.R. §§ 35.1-.24 (1975).
76. Id. §§ 35.16, .18.
77. City-Wide Coalition Against Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning v. Philadelphia Housing
Auth., 356 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
78. Id. at 126.
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frustrate the federal interest in encouraging rehabilitation. In short, there
are many considerations on both sides. The courts need a framework within
which to balance the relevant interests.
A. Presumption for Concurrent Regulation
The courts have indicated a preference for concurrent state and federal
regulation."9 Several factors support such a presumption. First, Congress can
make any law or regulation preemptive where it is necessary. Where it fails
to include such language, an inference of coexistence seems reasonable.
Second, where a vast area like consumer protection is involved, regulation
needs to be encouraged, not restrained by preemption. Third, the consumer
area is especially suitable for state and municipal concerns due to the local
nature of many consumer problems." Finally, the coordination of a broad
range of consumer protection activities, including civil remedies, criminal
sanctions, educational campaigns, investigations, and dissemination of informa-
tion, depend on state and local governments. Thus, a general presumption of
non-preemption seems appropriate.
B. Factors Supporting Preemption
Since Congress seldom declares that a given statute or regulation shall
supersede state or local law, courts must look to other indicia, such as the
purpose of the federal regulation, the extent of federal activity in the field,
the practical capacity of the federal agency to regulate the field, and the
policy or attitude of the federal agency on the preemption issue.
Guessing legislative motive is almost always hazardous. 1 At times, although
the objectives of an act of Congress are not clearly stated, they can be readily
inferred. For example, when Congress seeks to provide a license or immunity
to a person who complies with federal law, the state is impliedly preempted
from restricting the use of that license or privilege. 2 Such a result is particu-
larly common in the case of interstate carriers where the need for interstate
mobility transcends local interests." Courts sometimes have held a federal
standard preemptive because of the need to give comprehensive and predict-
79. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
80. The recent report of the Council of State Governments noted:
States exercise police power and are the traditional law and order authority
in the United States. The main source of the protection of the people is the
state civil and criminal statutes . . . . There is considerable production for
the local market and most fraud perpetrated upon the consumer is local in
character. State laws supplemented by local ordinances, and state officials and
personnel assisted by local officials, can best handle local market problems,
including the vast majority of fraud cases.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES 20 (1970).
81. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1254-69 (1970).
82. See, e.g., Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
83. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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able effect to a federal action. The Supreme Court has held that a person
given a federal discharge in bankruptcy could not be denied a state driver's
license on grounds of financial irresponsibility." Conceding that a valid state
interest in ensuring highway safety could be linked with solvency, the majority
nonetheless held that denying the license "frustrates the full effectiveness of
federal law" and the goal of the bankruptcy discharge procedure.8' The
strong federal policy was to enable discharged debtors to enjoy "a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,""8 a goal which the state
law thwarted.
The federal purpose test of preemption occasionally has found its way
into the consumer area. Relatively few federal laws bearing on consumer
interests grant the seller a federal license or immunity from state registration.
However, in striking down a California law governing accuracy of weight
statements on meat package labels, a district court talked of the "federal
statutory scheme which, when properly executed by state or federal officers,
secures to the American homemaker the assurance that expected wholesome-
ness and value is [sic] received for each consumer dollar spent."" Such a
sweeping holding is quite unusual in the judicial interpretation of federal
consumer laws.
From time to time the courts have suggested that federal regulation may
be so pervasive that it leaves little or no room for state intervention. If, for
example, a federal agency has issued extensive regulations covering virtually
every dimension of a field, concurrent regulation by other governmental
entities is likely to be foreclosed. On this basis the Supreme Court held that
cities could not restrict the schedules of federally regulated aircraft. In
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,"8 a five to four majority held
that local regulations must yield, although "control of noise [was] of course
deep-seated in the police powers of the States."" The pervasive nature of the
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise led to the conclusion that the
field was preempted. The pervasive control vested in the EPA and the FAA
seem to leave no room for local curfews or other noise control."0
Partial or limited federal regulation may tip the balance in favor of
84. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
85. Id. at 652.
86. Id. at 648, citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). For a recent
reaffirmation of this principle in a slightly different context, see Rutledge v. City of
Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975) (effect of bankruptcy and discharge
on eligibility for public employment).
87. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 357 F. Supp. 529, 535 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in part,
44 U.S.L.W. 2218 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 1975).
88. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
89. Id. at 638.
90. Id. at 633. See Federal Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970); id. § 1431
(Supp. II, 1.972) (control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom).
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coexistence between federal and state regulation.91 In the Avocado case the
Court stressed that the Agriculture Department regulated only the origin of
the avocados and not their shipment or sale." In the previous term, the Court
had given preemptive effect to the Tobacco Inspection Act.' The Avocado
majority distinguished that law as more pervasive than the Agricultural
Marketing Act since the Tobacco Act covered production, shipment, sale,
and storage.4
A regulatory scheme can be "pervasive" without occupying every nook and
cranny. If there are gaps, they may be the deliberate result of a federal
decision that no one should regulate the lacunae, not of Congress having
abstained. In addition to the sheer amount of federal legislation and rule-
making, the pervasiveness of the federal scheme should be examined. A recent
consumer case illustrates this point. In resolving a dispute between state and
federal regulations, a federal district court found the federal provision invalid
but nonetheless concluded that the state regulation was preempted. The
ultimate issue was the pervasiveness of the federal scheme or system, not
of the particular law implementing that system. 5
Even if the federal purpose or the extent of regulation suggests preemption,
courts should consider the practical consequences of such a holding. A federal
agency may have extensive legal powers but lack the personnel and other
resources necessary for effective regulation. Such practical considerations will
often tip the balance in favor of state or local regulation. In Head v. New
Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry,"9 for example, when the radio station
argued that the powers of the Federal Trade Commission were preemptive
in the field of regulation of price advertising in eyeglasses, Mr. Justice
Brennan dismissed the suggestion on practical grounds:
[I]t appears that the FTC is neither-equipped for nor desirous of
assuming exclusive responsibility for essentially local advertising
abuses, particularly where the state regulation complements the
federal prohibitions.
If Congress clearly favors some regulation and a preemptive decision would
leave an overburdened federal agency alone in the field, the case for con-
current regulation is strengthened.
Another airline regulation case illustrates the "practical capacity" principle.
In the late 1950's the practice of "overbooking" by major airlines became
increasingly common and seriously inconvenienced air travelers. In response
91. E.g., TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), aff'd mer., 396 U.S.
556 (1969).
92. 373 U.S. at 150.
93. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1962), interpreting 7 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
94. 373 U.S. at 147.
95. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 357 F. Supp. 529 (C.D. Cal. 1973), af'd in part, 44
U.S.L.W. 2218 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 1975).
96. 374 U.S. 424 (1963). See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
97. 374 U.S. at 441 n.20 (concurring opinion).
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to many complaints, the Civil Aeronautics Board adopted a regulation for-
bidding the practice, but failed to enforce it. A federal district court took
matters into its own hands and fashioned a remedy for a passenger who had
been "bumped" as a result of overbooking." The court based its decision
substantially on the inability or unwillingness of the responsible agency to
address a serious consumer problem. Using similar logic, a federal court of
appeals allowed recovery under state tort law for burns suffered from the
combustion of a flammable nightgown," rejecting the manufacturer's argument
that the federal Flammable Fabrics Act.. set exclusive standards.' The
preemption argument was denied in part because the Secretary of Commerce
had not, in the 14 years since passage of the law, exercised his responsibility
to promulgate regulations. The dilemma facing the court was particularly
difficult; in 1967 Congress had added a provision that federal law should
supersede inconsistent state standards governing flammable fabrics."' The
court gave this language a very narrow scope, partly because the responsible
federal administrator had failed to employ the rulemaking authority which
probably would have occupied the field."'
A final and closely related factor is the position taken by the federal
agency itself on the issue of preemption. In the Head case, the Supreme
Court deferred in large part to the view of the FCC that state eyeglass price
advertising regulation should not be preempted."4 Such statements are highly
relevant in the absence of any congressional declaration or evidence of legis-
lative intent. Occasionally, however, a court has refused to permit an agency
to abrogate its responsibility for a particular regulatory field, reading its
congressional mandate more broadly."' In other contexts, notably labor-
management relations, the courts have held a field preempted by the federal
government even though the agency declined to exercise its authority.''
In the consumer area, federal agencies have not only permitted but have
often encouraged concurrent state and local regulation. The FTC has been
particularly hospitable. Nearly a decade ago the Commission created a
special Office of Federal-State Cooperation."7 The office staff has worked
98. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 363--65 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
(compensatory and punitive damages). See generally O'Neil, Public Regulation and
Private Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 231, 261-67 (1964).
99. Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1191 etseq. (1970).
101. 484 F.2d at 1028.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1203 (1970).
103. 484 F.2d at 1028.
104. 374 U.S. at 431-32. See Note, Federal Preemption of State Laws: The Effect of
Regulatory Agency Attitudes on Judicial Decisionmaking, 50 IND. L.J. 848 (1975).
105. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch.,
178 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
106. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
107. See notes 16-18 supra.
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closely with state and local consumer protection agencies not only in gathering
and disseminating information but in strengthening laws and remedies below
the federal level."8 Special encouragement has been given to. the enactment
of so-called "little FTC" laws which imitate the federal statute and provide
parallel penalties."' In seven cities, the FTC field offices have organized
consumer protection committees which attempt "to bring all federal, state
and local consumer protection agencies in a particular area together" and
thus "create a 'one stop' consumer protection complaint service.""1 ' Recently,
the FTC also has urged states to repeal or abolish laws such as fair trade and
resale price maintenance provisions which may hurt consumer interests.11
Thus the federal practice increasingly has been one of close cooperation and
willingness to share jurisdiction with state and local agencies.
Other federal agencies in the consumer field are not as cooperative as the
FTC. As noted earlier, some 40 departments, bureaus, commissions, and
other units of the federal government are involved to some degree in consumer
protection. A substantial risk of conflict may exist but may not have been
addressed by an agency. Courts mist try to infer the agency's position on
concurrent regulation. If the CAB will not act on overbooking or the Commerce
Department on combustible nightgowns when the need for effective consumer
protection is clear, the agency may have waived any claim to exclusive
regulation. Obviously a clear statement of agency position, such as that
adopted by the FTC, would give the courts far better guidance than the
more typical silence. The courts perform a useful service by refusing to honor
preemption claims absent substantial agency commitment to consumer interests.
C. Factors Supporting State Regulation
State and local interests in consumer protection may be easier to. assess
than the federal. The time is long gone, if it ever existed, when Congress
could not touch certain subjects because of the strong interests of the states
and cities in the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. The Supreme
Court has recognized that falling back on the general local police power does
little to resolve preemption claims.1 More careful analysis is required. Where
the objective of state or local regulation differs substantially from that of a
conflicting federal law, the disparity may support coexistence. Perhaps the
best illustration is the Supreme Court's decision in Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit."' In Huron, the Court upheld a municipal smoke
108. See A Time for Renewal, supra note 7, at 413-14.
109. See note 52 supra.
110. Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, in
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 545, A-5, -7 (Nov. 11, 1972) (outlining
federal-state coordination procedure).
111. Cincinnati (Ohio) Enquirer, Jan. 1, 1975, § C, at 1, col. 1. See Pub. L. No. 94-145,
§§ 1, 2 (Dec. 12, 1975) (repeal of fair trade laws).
112. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1954).
113. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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abatement law as applied to ships with federally inspected and approved
boiler systems. The majority emphasized that Detroit wanted to reduce air
pollution while the federal inspection and licensing system sought to ensure
safety. But for this difference of purpose, preemption would probably have
existed since the federal law was pervasive and Congress clearly intended to
permit licensed vessels to pass freely through interstate waterways.
The "difference of purpose" test has supported several later decisions
upholding concurrent regulation. A federal district court recently supported
a New York City regulation that reduced the lead in retail gasoline below
the federally allowed amount."4 The federal rule was designed to protect
automobile emission control devices, while the city ordinance promoted
health and safety. In addition, the federal administrator had authority to
promulgate rules for the second purpose, but had done nothing, possibly
tipping the balance in favor of coexistence.115
A clearer example of divergent purposes occurred recently in the drug
and pharmaceutical area. When a pharmacists license was 'suspended by
the state licensing board for "grossly unprofessional conduct,". the pharma-
cist appealed the suspension on the ground that federal drug laws covered
the same infraction. The court rejected the claim of preemption because the
objectives of the two laws were quite different. The purpose of the federal
act was to prevent unfair trade practices, while the state law sought to
protect the public health." '
At this point the case of the lead-based paint conflict between the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development and the City of Philadelphia is
instructive."' All the criteria examined thus far supported preemption. The
federal scheme was pervasive and the standard quite explicit; the purposes
of the two laws were identical; and meeting the city standard would entail
substantial cost. Nevertheless, the court found no preemption. The dispositive
factors appear to have been the strength of the state interest and the judge's
feeling that HUD was insensitive to that interest:
To equate the admittedly real and grave danger of permanent brain
damage to small children with the relatively modest additional cost
of rehabilitating houses to free them from lead-based paint raises
issues that no amount of rationalization or legal theory can justify on
moral grounds."'
A similar concern appeared in the flammable nightgown case; the court of
114. Exxon v. City of N.Y., 356 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
115. Id. at 663.
116. Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 333, 225 A.2d 728, 731 (Super.
Ct. Chancery Div. 1966).
117. Id.
118. City-Wide Coalition Against Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning v. Philadelphia Housing
Auth., 356 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying
text.
119. 356 F. Supp. at 131.
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appeals noted "the plight of burn victims who are most often the very young
and the aged .. 120 Earlier, a district court had upheld a municipal anti-
fireworks ordinance in part because of "Houston's tragic experience with fire-
works explosions."... Courts in these cases did not hesitate to consider the
preemption issue in the light of the strength or gravity of the state's interest.
The Supreme Court has hesitated to rank regulatory interests for supremacy
clause purposes. In the Avocado case, the Florida growers challenging the
California law argued that, because the California law did not relate to health
or safety, it was less worthy of concurrent existence with the federal regulation.
Immature avocados were not dangerous, just a waste of money. But the Court
found no hierarchy of regulatory interests, suggesting that a law designed
to keep consumers from being cheated was as valid as one to keep them
healthy..2
Perhaps any valid exercise of state regulatory power is entitled to consider-
able deference. The question may focus less on the importance of the state or
local interest than on the adequacy of the allegedly conflicting federal stan-
dard .in serving that interest. Thus, interests as insignificant as protecting
consumers from poor quality avocados and as important as protecting children
from lead poisoning can survive in the face of concurrent federal regulation.
Courts consider the scope of state and local regulation just as they appraise
the extent of federal activity before deciding the preemption issue. At the
very least, such information relates to whether Congress meant to displace
state and local law. The Supreme Court remarked in the Head case that a
broad grant of federal power would be a curious way to "supplant all the
detailed state regulation of professional advertising practices" that had been
brought to the Court's attention."3 Similar issues were raised in a challenge
to a Massachusetts law"' prohibiting promotional contests or games of chance
with cash prizes for promotional purposes.' 3 Mobil Oil sued in state court
alleging that the law was unconstitutional because it conflicted with a recent
FTC rule regulating games of chance in the gasoline industry."' The court
found state regulation of a field into which the FTC had only lately moved
to be pervasive and of long standing. Prior to the FTC rule, similar promo-
tional games had been declared unlawful in many states under traditional
anti-gambling laws. At least three states had specific laws covering such
games and contests. The court concluded:
In view of the demonstrated local interest in this area, we believe
120. Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973).
121. Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
122. 373 U.S. at 144.
123. 374 U.S. at 4 31.
124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 271, § 6C (Supp. 1975).
125. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney General, 361 Mass. 401, 280 N.E.2d 406 (1972).




that had the Commission intended to affect the substantial body of
existing State law and preclude further State action it would have
expressly so stated." '
In the consumer protection area, the extent Of state and local involvement
varies widely. Certain practices have been regulated for decades, while others
have only recently come under legal scrutiny and constraint. Consumer
interests at the state and local level are represented increasingly by agencies,
not through private suits or criminal prosecutions.' The staffs to enforce
consumer protection laws have expanded impressively in recent years. As
such regulation increases, the case for preemption becomes weaker.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the increasing importance of preemption issues in the rapidly
proliferating field of consumer protection, it is imperative that courts have
some firm guidelines. Disturbingly few fixed principles have emerged.
Although Congress could declare which laws are preemptive, the exigencies
of the federal system and national politics have virtually precluded such
clarification. The Supreme Court has resolved supremacy clause cases in a
highly individualized fashion. In highlighting what common factors exist,
this Article has sought to rationalize an inordinately untidy area of constitu-
tional law. Attempting to find coherence may be the ultimate testimony to
the extent of the chaos. Seizing these few threads of continuity, courts may
be able to lessen future confusion and delay in protecting consumers.
127. Id. at 411, 280 N.E.2d at 414.
128. See, e.g., Sand & Weisberg, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into
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